Charitable Lottery Structure and Fund Raising: Theory and Evidence
- Donald J. Dale
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Do fixed-prize charitable lotteries generate more net revenue than do revenue-dependent lotteries? I present the results of an experiment designed to test a theoretical prediction of the relationship between the prize structure of a lottery funding a public good and individuals' participation in the lottery. I find that a fixed-prize lottery configuration induces significantly greater participation and a significantly higher level of public good funding than does a revenue-dependent lottery.
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- Charitable Lottery Structure and Fund Raising: Theory and Evidence
Volume 7, Issue 3 , pp 217-234
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- Kluwer Academic Publishers
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- Donald J. Dale (1)
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- 1. Muhlenberg College, USA