Journal of Philosophical Logic

, Volume 29, Issue 5, pp 433–482

On Meaningfulness and Truth

  • Brian Edison McDonald

DOI: 10.1023/A:1026528019554

Cite this article as:
McDonald, B.E. Journal of Philosophical Logic (2000) 29: 433. doi:10.1023/A:1026528019554


We show how to construct certain “LM, T-type” interpreted languages, with each such language containing meaningfulness and truth predicates which apply to itself. These languages are comparable in expressive power to the LT-type, truth-theoretic languages first considered by Kripke, yet each of our LM, T-type languages possesses the additional advantage that, within it, the meaninglessness of any given meaningless expression can itself be meaningfully expressed. One therefore has, for example, the object level truth (and meaningfulness) of the claim that the strengthened Liar is meaningless.

truthparadoxliarmeaningfulnessvariational semantics

Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2000

Authors and Affiliations

  • Brian Edison McDonald
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyIndiana UniversityBloomingtonUSA