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Learning to Take Turns

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Abstract

Learning to take turns in repeated game situations is a robust phenomenon in both laboratory experiments and in everyday life. Nevertheless, it has received little attention in recent studies of learning dynamics in games. We investigate the simplest and most obvious extension of fictitious play to a learning rule that can recognize patterns, and show how players using this rule can spontaneously learn to take turns.

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Vanderschraaf, P., Skyrms, B. Learning to Take Turns. Erkenntnis 59, 311–347 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1026046625024

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