Does Belief Have an Aim?
- David John Owens
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The hypothesis that belief aims at the truth has been used to explain three features of belief: (1) the fact that correct beliefs are true beliefs, (2) the fact that rational beliefs are supported by the evidence and (3) the fact that we cannot form beliefs `at will’. I argue that the truth-aim hypothesis cannot explain any of these facts. In this respect believing differs from guessing since the hypothesis that guessing aims at the truth can explain the three analogous features of guessing. I conclude that, unlike guessing, believing is not purposive in any interesting sense.
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- Does Belief Have an Aim?
Volume 115, Issue 3 , pp 283-305
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- Kluwer Academic Publishers
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- David John Owens (1)
- Author Affiliations
- 1. Department of Philosophy, University of Sheffield, Western Bank, Sheffield, S10 2TN, UK (E-mail