Tye’s Representationalism: Feeling the Heat?
- Richard GrayAffiliated withDepartment of Philosophy, Trinity College
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According to Tye’s PANIC theory of consciousness, perceptualstates of creatures which are related to a disjunction ofexternal contents will fail to represent sensorily, andthereby fail to be conscious states. In this paper I arguethat heat perception, a form of perception neglected in therecent literature, serves as a counterexample to Tye’sradical externalist claim. Having laid out Tye’s `absentqualia’ scenario, the PANIC theory from which it derivesand the case of heat perception as a counterexample, Idefend the putative counterexample against three possibleresponses: (1) that heat perception represents general(i.e. non-disjunctive) intrinsic properties of objects,(2) that heat perception represents the non-specific heatenergy that is transferred between a subject’s body andanother body and (3) that heat perception exclusivelyrepresents heat properties of the subject’s own body.
- Tye’s Representationalism: Feeling the Heat?
Volume 115, Issue 3 , pp 245-256
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- Kluwer Academic Publishers
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- Richard Gray (1)
- Author Affiliations
- 1. Department of Philosophy, Trinity College, Dublin