Argumentation

, Volume 17, Issue 1, pp 35–42

Who Needs Valid Moral Arguments? (Dedicated to the Memory of R.M. Chisholm, 1916–1999)

Authors

  • Mark T. Nelson
    • Department of PhilosophyUniversity of Leeds
Article

DOI: 10.1023/A:1022950020703

Cite this article as:
Nelson, M.T. Argumentation (2003) 17: 35. doi:10.1023/A:1022950020703

Abstract

Why have so many philosophers agonised over the possibility of valid arguments from factual premises to moral conclusions? I suggest that they have done so, because of worries over a sceptical argument that has as one of its premises, `All moral knowledge must be non-inferential, or, if inferential, based on valid arguments or strong inductive arguments from factual premises'. I argue that this premise is false.

Factual premisesmoral conclusionsmoral knowledgevalid arguments

Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2003