Abstract
The most common account of attitude reports is the relational analysis according towhich an attitude verb taking that-clause complements expresses a two-placerelation between agents and propositions and the that-clause acts as an expressionwhose function is to provide the propositional argument. I will argue that a closerexamination of a broader range of linguistic facts raises serious problems for thisanalysis and instead favours a Russellian `multiple relations analysis' (which hasgenerally been discarded because of its apparent obvious linguistic implausibility).The resulting account can be given independent philosophical motivations within anintentionalist view of truth and predication.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
REFERENCES
Asher, N.: 1993, Reference to Abstract Objects, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht.
Bach, K.: 1997, 'Do Belief Reports Report Beliefs?', Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 78, 215–241.
Bealer, G.: 1982, Quality and Concept, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Bennett, J.: 1988, Events and their Names, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Burge, T.: 1989, 'Intentionality and the Concept of Truth', Ms. UCLA.
Chomsky, N.: 1981, Lectures on Government and Binding, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Cresswell, M.: 1985, Structured Meanings, Bradford, Cambridge, MA.
Cresswell, M. and A. V. Stechow: 1982, 'De re Belief Generalized, Linguistics and Philosophy 5.
Crimmins, M. and J. Perry: 1989, 'The Prince and the Phone Booth', The Journal of Philosophy 86, 685–711.
Davidson, D.: 1968, 'On Saying That', Synthese 19, 130–146.
Davidson, D.: 1980, 'The Logical Form of Action Sentences', in D. Davidson, Essays on Actions and Events, pp. 163–187, originally in N. Rescher (ed.), The Logic of Decision and Action, Pittsburgh University Press, Pittsburgh, pp. 216-234.
Dummett, M.: 1982, 'Truth', in M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, Harvard, University Press, Cambridge, MA.
Fine, K.: 1982a, 'Acts, Events and Things', in W. Leinfellner et al. (eds.), Language and Ontology. Proceedings of the Eighth Wittgenstein Symposium, Hoelder-Pichler-Tempsky, Vienna, pp. 97–105.
Fine, K.: 1982b, 'First-Order Modal Theories III-Facts', Synthese 53, 293–308.
Frege, G.: 1892, 'Funktion und Begriff', reprinted in G. Patzig (ed.), Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung, Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, Goettingen.
Heim, I.: 1992, 'Presupposition Projection and the Semantics of Attitude Reports', Journal of Semantics 9, 183–221.
Hintikka, J.: 1962, Knowledge and Belief. An Introduction to the Two Notions, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N.Y.
Kaplan, D.: 1986, 'Opacity', in L. E. Hahn and P. A. Schilpp (eds.), The Philosophy of W. V. O. Quine, Open Court, La Salle, pp. 229–289.
Keenan, E. and E. Faltz: 1984, Boolean Semantics for Natural Language, Reidel, Dordrecht.
Kim, J.: 1976, 'Events as Property Exemplifications', in M. Brand and D. Walton (eds.), Action Theory Reidel, Dordrecht, pp. 159-177, reprinted in Laurence and Macdonald (eds.), pp. 159-177.
Lewis, D.: 1979, 'Attitudes de dictor and de se', Philosophical Review 88, 513–543.
Matthews. F.: 1994, 'The Measure of Mind', Mind 103, 131–146.
Prior, A.: 1971, Objects of Thought, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Quine, W. V. O.: 1956, 'Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes', Journal of Philosophy 53, 177–187.
Quine, W. V. O.: 1960, Word and Object, MIT Press, Cambridge.
Recanati, F.: 1993, Direct Reference. From Language to Thought, Blackwell, Oxford.
Rizzi, L.: 1999, Relativized Minimality, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Russell, B.: 1912, The Problems of Philosophy, London.
Russell, B.: 1913, Theory of Knowledge, The 1913 manuscript, edited by E. Ramsden Eames, Unwin Hyman Ltd, reprinted in 1993 by Routledge, London.
Russell, B.: 1918, 'The Philosophy of Logical Atomism', in B. Russell, Logic and Knowledge, Routledge, London.
Sainsbury, R. M.: 1979, Russell, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London.
Schiffer, S.: 1978, 'The Basis of Reference', Erkenntnis 13, 171–206.
Schiffer, S.: 1987, Remnants of Meaning, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Schiffer, S.: 1990, 'The Mode of Presentation Problem', in C. A. Anderson and J. Owens (eds.), Propositional Attitudes, CSLI Lecture Notes, Chicago UP, Chicago, pp. 249-268.
Schiffer, S.: 1992, 'Belief Ascription', Journal of Philosophy 89, 492–521.
Stalnaker, R.: 1984, Inquiry, MIT Press, Cambridge.
Thomason, R.: 1980, 'A Model Theory for Propositional Attitudes', Linguistics and Philosophy 4(1), 47–71.
Travis, C.: 1991, 'The Annals of Analysis', Mind 100, 237–264.
Travis, C.: 1997, 'Pragmatics', in B. Hale and C. Wright (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Language, Blackwell, Oxford, pp. 87–107.
Tye, M.: 1984 'The Adverbial Approach to Visual Experience', American Philosophical Quarterly 21.
Tye, M.: 1989, The Metaphysics of Mind, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Vendler, Z.: 1972, Res Cogitans, Cornell University Press, Ithaca.
Ziff, P.: 1972, 'What Is Said', in. D. Davidson and G. Harman (eds.), Semantics of Natural Language, pp. 709-721.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Moltmann, F. Propositional Attitudes Without Propositions. Synthese 135, 77–118 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1022945009188
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1022945009188