Abstract
Many competent speakers initially judge that (i) is true and (ii) isfalse, though they know that (iii) is true. (i) Superman leaps more tallbuildings than Clark Kent. (ii) Superman leaps more tall buildings thanSuperman. (iii) Superman is identical with Clark Kent. Semanticexplanations of these intuitions say that (i) and (ii) really can differin truth-value. Pragmatic explanations deny this, and say that theintuitions are due to misleading implicatures. This paper argues thatboth explanations are incorrect. (i) and (ii) cannot differ intruth-value, yet the intuitions are not due to implicatures, but ratherto mistakes in evaluating (i) and (ii).
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Braun, D., Saul, J. Simple Sentences, Substitutions, and Mistaken Evaluations. Philosophical Studies 111, 1–41 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1021287328280
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1021287328280