Abstract
I critically analyse two causal analyses of seeing, by Frank Jackson and Michael Tye.I show that both are unacceptable. I argue that Jackson's analysis fails because it doesnot rule out cases of non-seeing. Tye's analysis seems to be superior to Jackson's in thisrespect, but I show that it too lets in cases of non-seeing. I also show that Tye's proposed solution to a problem for his theory – which involves a robot that mimics another (unseen) robot – fails. Finally I show that his `variability' requirement is not necessary, because there are cases where someone can see an object even though the variability that Tye requires doesnot exist.
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Campbell, S. Causal Analyses Of Seeing. Erkenntnis 56, 169–180 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1015633007571
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1015633007571