Abstract
Pulier (2000, Theory and Decision 49: 291) and Machina (2000, Theory and Decision 49: 293) seek to dissolve the Barrett–Arntzenius infinite decision puzzle (1999, Theory and Decision 46: 101). The proposed dissolutions, however, are based on misunderstandings concerning how the puzzle works and the nature of supertasks more generally. We will describe the puzzle in a simplified form, address the recent misunderstandings, and describe possible morals for decision theory.
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References
Barrett J. A. and tzenius, F. (1999), An ifinite decision puzzle, Theory and Decision 46(3): 101–103.
Earman, J. and Norton, J.D. (1996), Infinite pains: The trouble with supertasks, in A. Morton and S. Stich (eds.), Benacerraf and His Critics, pp. 231–261. Oxford: Blackwell.
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Machina, M. J. (2000), Barrett and Arntzenius's, infinite decision puzzle, Theory and Decision 49(3): 293–297.
Pulier, M. L. (2000), A flawed infinite decision puzzle, Theory and Decision 49(3): 291–292.
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Barrett, J.A., Arntzenius, F. Why the Infinite Decision Puzzle is Puzzling. Theory and Decision 52, 139–147 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1015564123344
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1015564123344