Abstract
In this paper we develop and test a model of voter turnoutthat permits us to differentiate turnout rates for governmentemployees and other citizens, controlling for the effects of awide range of other variables relating to turnout. Using 1996ANES data, we find that there is a significant difference inturnout rates for bureaucrats and nonbureaucrats, both insimple bivariate analyses and in a full multivariate model.The magnitude and significance of the coefficient forgovernment employment, even in the face of controls, suggeststhere is something about government employment per sethat has an effect on turnout.
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Corey, E.C., Garand, J.C. Are Government Employees more Likely to Vote?: An Analysis of Turnout in the 1996 U.S. National Election. Public Choice 111, 259–283 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1015290806607
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1015290806607