What do Candidates Maximize (and Why Should Anyone Care)?
- Jeffrey Milyo
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Much empirical work on Congressional elections implicitly assumesthat candidates are vote-maximizers; this may be a fairassumption for challengers, but it is not a good description ofincumbent behavior. I present a general intertemporal utilitymaximizing model of candidate behavior, which includes vote-maximization as a special case. I then demonstrate that thesemodels have important consequences for both the design andinterpretation of empirical work.
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- What do Candidates Maximize (and Why Should Anyone Care)?
Volume 109, Issue 1-2 , pp 119-139
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- Jeffrey Milyo (1)
- Author Affiliations
- 1. Harris School, University of Chicago, Chicago, IL, 60637, U.S.A