Abstract
Charles Morgan has argued that nonmonotonic logic is ``impossible''. We show here that those arguments are mistaken, and that Morgan's preferred alternative, the representation of nonmonotonic reasoning by ``presuppositions'' fails to provide a framework in which nonmonotonic reasoning can be constructively criticised. We argue that an inductive logic, based on probabilistic acceptance, offers more than Morgan's approach through presuppositions.
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Kyburg, H.E. Real Logic is Nonmonotonic. Minds and Machines 11, 577–595 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1011808015672
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1011808015672