Abstract
In practice one rarely observes pure forms of dictatorship that lack a council, or pure forms of parliament that lack an executive. Generally government policies emerge from organizations that combine an executive branch of government, “the king,” with a cabinet or parliamentary branch, “the council.” This paper provides an explanation for this regularity, and also provides an evolutionary model of the emergence of democracy that does not require a revolution. The analysis demonstrates that the bipolar “king and council” constitutional template has a number of properties that gives it great practical efficiency as a method of information processing and as a very flexible institutional arrangement for making collective decisions.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Aristotle. (1962) The Politics. Translated by T. A. Sinclair. New York: Penguin.
Bély, L. (1998) The History of France. (translated by A. Moyon) Paris: Jean–Paul Giserot.
Breton, A., and Wintrobe, R. (1975) “The Equilibrium Size of a Budget–Maximizing Bureau: A Note on Niskanen's Theory of Bureaucracy.” Journal of Political Economy 83: 195–207.
Buchanan, J. M. (1975) The Limits of Liberty: Between Anarchy and Leviathan. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Buchanan, J. M. (1987) “The Constitution of Economic Policy.” American Economic Review 77: 243–50.
Buchanan, J. M., and Tullock, G. (1962) The Calculus of Consent, Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Bush, W. (1972) “Individual Welfare in Anarchy.” In: Tullock, G. (ed.) Explorations in the Theory of Anarchy," Blacksburg, VA: Center for Study of Public Choice.
Carter, J. R., and Schap D. (1987) “Executive Veto, Legislative Override and Structure–Induced Equilibrium.” Public Choice 52: 227–44.
Congleton, R. D. (1989) “Efficient Status Seeking, Externalities and the Evolution of Status Games.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 11: 175–90.
Congleton, R. D. (2001A) “Rational Ignorance and Rationally Biased Expectations: The Discrete Informational Foundations of Fiscal Illusion.” Public Choice 107: 634–64.
Congleton, R. D. (2001B) Perfecting Parliament: Constitutional Interests and Reform. Book manuscript, Center for Study of Public Choice.
Congleton, R. D. (1980) “Competitive Process, Competitive Waste, and Institutions.” In: J. Buchanan, J., Tollison, R., and Tullock, G. (eds.) Towards a Theory of the Rent–Seeking Society, pp. 153–79. Texas A and M Press. Reprinted in Congleton, R. D., and Tollison, R. D. (eds.) (1995) The Economic Analysis of Rent Seeking. London: Edgar Elgar Press, pp. 101–27.
Dudley, L. (2000) “The Rationality of Revolution.” Economics of Governance 1: 77–103.
Dudley, L. M. (1991) The Word and the Sword: How Techniques of Information and Violence Have Shaped our World. Oxford: Blackwell.
Frank, R. H. (1985) Choosing the Right Pond, Human Behavior and the Quest for Status. New York: Oxford University Press.
Hirsch, F. (1995) Social Limits to Growth. London: Routledge.
Hobbes, T. (1959) Leviathan. New York: E. P. Dutton.
Holmberg, E., Stjernquist, N. (1995) Constitutional Documents of Sweden. Stockholm: The Swedish Riksdag.
Kuran, T. (1989) “Sparks and Prairie Fires: A Theory of Unanticipated Political Revolution.” Public Choice 61: 41–74.
McKelvy, R. (1976) “Intransitivities in Multidimensional Voting Models and Some Implications for Agenda Control.” Journal of Economic Theory 12: 472–82.
Mommsen, W. J. (1995) Imperial Germany 1867–1918. (Translation of Der Autoritäre Nationalstaat, by R. Deveson) New York: Oxford University Press.
Morgan, K. O. (ed.) (1997) The Oxford Illustrated History of Britain. New York: Oxford University Press.
Mueller, D. (1989) Public Choice II. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Niskanen, W. A. (1969) “Nonmarket Decision–making: The Peculiar Economics of Bureaucracy.” American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 59: 293–305
North, D. C. (1987) “Institutions, Transactions Costs and Economic Growth.” Economic Inquiry 25: 419–28.
North, D. C., and Weingast, B. R. (1989) “Institutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutional Governing, Public Choice in Seventeenth–Century England.” Journal of Economic History 49: 803–32.
Palmer, R. R., and Colton, J. (1965) A History of the Modern World. New York: Alfred Knopf.
Petersson, O. (1994) The Government and Politics of Nordic Countries. Translated by F. G. Perry. Stockholm: CE Fritzes AB (Kluwer).
Rawls, J. (1971) A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Schap, D. (1986) “Executive Veto and Informational Strategy: A Structure Induced Equilibrium Analysis.” American Journal of Political Science 30: 755–70.
Strayer, J. R., and Gatzke, H. W. (1978) The Mainstream of Civilization. New York: Harcourt Brace, Jovanovich.
Tullock, G. (1987) Autocracy. Dordrecht: Marinus Nijhoff.
Voigt, S. (1999a) “Breaking with the Notion of Social Contract: Constitutions as Based on Spontaneously Arisen Institutions.” Constitutional Political Economy 10: 283–300.
Voigt, S. (1999b) Explaining Constitutional Change: A Positive Economics Approach. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Verney, D. V. (1957) Parliamentary Reform in Sweden 1866–1921. London: Oxford at the Clarendon Press.
Weibull, J. (1993) Swedish History in Outline. The Swedish Institute. Translated by P. B. Austin.
Wintrobe, R. (1998) The Political Economy of Dictatorship. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Congleton, R.D. On the Durability of King and Council: The Continuum Between Dictatorship and Democracy. Constitutional Political Economy 12, 193–215 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1011605310916
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1011605310916