Abstract
The article tries to qualify the contentious issue of whetherthere is a human right to welfare. Our notion of human rightsis practically without criteria for distinguishing between whenit is used correctly and when incorrectly. The first step inany satisfactory resolution of the issue about welfare rightsis to supply duly determinate criteria. I then consider thechief reasons for doubting that there is a human right towelfare, in the light of what seem to be, all things considered,the best criteria to attach to the notion of a human right.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Griffin, J. Welfare Rights. The Journal of Ethics 4, 27–43 (2000). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1009899901413
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1009899901413