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A Third Principle of Justice

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Abstract

In this paper I argue that in order to secure the commitment of believers in reasonable comprehensive doctrines to political liberalism a third principle of justice needs to be adopted in the Original Position. Rawls acknowledges that “neutral” legislation by the liberal state may negatively affect some reasonable comprehensive doctrines, and I offer a third principle of justice to help alleviate this problem. This principle, which I believe is in keeping with the United States constitutional history especially where church-state relations are concerned, maintains that a constitutional regime should, insofar as possible, avoid adopting rules with harmful effects upon those comprehensive doctrines which satisfy the conditions of reasonable pluralism.

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Wilkins, B.T. A Third Principle of Justice. The Journal of Ethics 1, 355–374 (1997). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1009762232310

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1009762232310

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