Consent for Change: Article V and The Constitutional Amendment Process
- Thomas F. Schaller
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The political economy of U.S. constitutional amendmentswithin the guidelines of Article V is shown to tend toward minoritarianism.Specifically, two shifts reduce the consent necessary to passamendments, each potentially raising the social costs of changingthe Constitution by amendment. A typology of amending “climates”is offered, followed by a discussion of the normative implicationsfor constitutional stability of minoritarian rule in amendmentpolitics.
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- Consent for Change: Article V and The Constitutional Amendment Process
Constitutional Political Economy
Volume 8, Issue 3 , pp 195-213
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- Kluwer Academic Publishers
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- Author Affiliations
- 1. Department of Political Science, Binghamton University, Binghamton, New York, 13902-6000