Abstract
This article critically examines SaulKripke's (1972) argument for the separability ofnecessary truths from truths known a priori,focusing on his criticism of the standard meter casepresented by Wittgenstein (1968). It attempts to showthat Kripke's argument is unworkable on any of severalreadings. Wittgenstein's own broadly conventionalistaccount of necessary truth is then considered in thelight of the standard meter example.
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REFERENCES
Kripke, S.: 1972, Naming and Necessity, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
Wittgenstein, L.: 1968, Philosophical Investigations, G. E. M. Anscombe (trans.), Macmillan, New York.
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Wittgenstein, L.: 1978, Philosophical Grammar, R. Rhees (ed.), A. Kenny (trans.), University of California Press, Berkeley.
Wittgenstein, L.: 1983, Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, G. H. von Wright, R. Rhees, G. E. M. Anscombe (eds), G. E. M Anscombe (trans.), MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
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Loomis, E. Necessity, The A Priori, And The Standard Meter. Synthese 121, 291–307 (1999). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005229326821
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005229326821