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Modality, Si! Modal Logic, No!

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Abstract

This article is oriented toward the use of modality in artificial intelligence (AI). An agent must reason about what it or other agents know, believe, want, intend or owe. Referentially opaque modalities are needed and must be formalized correctly. Unfortunately, modal logics seem too limited for many important purposes. This article contains examples of uses of modality for which modal logic seems inadequate.

I have no proof that modal logic is inadequate, so I hope modal logicians will take the examples as challenges.

Maybe this article will also have philosophical and mathematical logical interest.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Computer Science Department, Stanford University, Stanford, Ca, 94305

    John Mccarthy

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  1. John Mccarthy
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Mccarthy, J. Modality, Si! Modal Logic, No!. Studia Logica 59, 29–32 (1997). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004943332720

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004943332720

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