Abstract
Environmental problems will increasingly spill over national boundaries. An effective and efficient response to these problems will require international solutions; relying purely on national regulatory mechanisms to address global issues will not suffice. To meet this need, better international environmental programs must be developed that maximize collective gain, enforce property rights, address the range of environmental values present in different countries, and fairly determine who should pay for global-scale pollution control.
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Esty, D.C., Mendelsohn, R. Moving from national to international environmental policy. Policy Sciences 31, 225–235 (1998). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004365815542
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004365815542