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Lottery Versus All-Pay Auction Models of Lobbying

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Abstract

I first provide a complete characterizationof the unique equilibrium of thelottery game by n lobbyists with asymmetricvaluations, and then compare the lotteryand the all-pay auction models of lobbying.I show that the exclusion principlediscovered by Baye, Kovenock and de Vries(1993) for all-pay auction does not applyto lottery. I also show that the perverse effectthat an exogenous cap may increase thetotal lobbying expenditure in a two-bidderall-pay auction discovered by Che and Gale(1998) does not apply to lottery.

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  1. Department of Economics, Yale University, New Haven, CT, 06511, U.S.A.

    Hanming Fang

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  1. Hanming Fang
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Fang, H. Lottery Versus All-Pay Auction Models of Lobbying. Public Choice 112, 351–371 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1019915126367

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1019915126367

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