Abstract
Davidson's account of weakness of will dependsupon a parallel that he draws between practicaland theoretical reasoning. I argue that theparallel generates a misleading picture oftheoretical reasoning. Once the misleadingpicture is corrected, I conclude that theattempt to model akratic belief on Davidson'saccount of akratic action cannot work. Thearguments that deny the possibility of akraticbelief also undermine, more generally, variousattempts to assimilate theoretical to practicalreasoning.
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Adler, J.E. Akratic Believing?. Philosophical Studies 110, 1–27 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1019823330245
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1019823330245