Synthese

, Volume 131, Issue 3, pp 371–388

Is Hintikka's Logic First-Order?

Authors

  • Matti Eklund
    • HugvísindastofnunUniversity of Iceland
  • Daniel Kolak
    • Department of PhilosophyWilliam Paterson University
Article

DOI: 10.1023/A:1016184410627

Cite this article as:
Eklund, M. & Kolak, D. Synthese (2002) 131: 371. doi:10.1023/A:1016184410627

Abstract

Jaakko Hintikka has argued that ordinary first-order logic should be replaced byindependence-friendly first-order logic, where essentially branching quantificationcan be represented. One recurring criticism of Hintikka has been that Hintikka'ssupposedly new logic is equivalent to a system of second-order logic, and henceis neither novel nor first-order. A standard reply to this criticism by Hintikka andhis defenders has been to show that given game-theoretic semantics, Hintikka'sbranching quantifiers receive the exact same treatment as the regular first-orderones. We develop a different reply, based around considerations concerning thenature of logic. In particular, we argue that Hintikka's logic is the logic that bestrepresents the language fragment standard first-order logic is meantto represent. Therefore it earns its keep, and is also properly regarded as first-order.

Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2002