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You Don't Say?

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Abstract

This paper defends a purely semantic notionof what is said against various recent objections. Theobjections each cite some sort of linguistic,psychological, or epistemological fact that issupposed to show that on any viable notion of what aspeaker says in uttering a sentence, there ispragmatic intrusion into what is said. Relying on amodified version of Grice's notion, on which what issaid must be a projection of the syntax of the utteredsentence, I argue that a purely semantic notion isneeded to account for the linguistically determinedinput to the hearer's inference to what, if anything,the speaker intends to be conveying in uttering thesentence.

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Bach, K. You Don't Say?. Synthese 128, 15–44 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1010353722852

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1010353722852

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