Abstract
The proof-theoretic results on axiomatic theories oftruth obtained by different authors in recent years are surveyed.In particular, the theories of truth are related to subsystems ofsecond-order analysis. On the basis of these results, thesuitability of axiomatic theories of truth for ontologicalreduction is evaluated.
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Halbach, V. Truth and Reduction. Erkenntnis 53, 97–126 (2000). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005662017962
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005662017962