Abstract
Poindexter points and asserts `That is Clinton'. But it is vague as to whether he pointed at Clinton or pointed at the more salient man, Gore. Since the vagueness only occurs at the level of reference fixing, the content of the identity proposition is precise. Indeed, it is either a necessary truth or a necessary falsehood. Since Poindexter's utterance has a hidden truth value by virtue of vagueness, it increases the plausibility of epistemicism. Epistemicism says that vague statements have hidden truth values. If a precise statement can have a hidden truth value conferred indirectly by vaguesness, then a vague statement can have a hidden truth value directly by its own vagueness.
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Sorensen, R.A. A Vague Demonstration. Linguistics and Philosophy 23, 507–522 (2000). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005540431474
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005540431474