Modeling Other-Regarding Preferences and an Experimental Test
- Cite this article as:
- Frohlich, N., Oppenheimer, J. & Kurki, A. Public Choice (2004) 119: 91. doi:10.1023/B:PUCH.0000024169.08329.eb
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Behavior inconsistent with self-interest has beenobserved in many contexts. We argue thatmodels designed to cope with theseanomalies are inadequate to deal with avariety of social values. Our extension ofthe Fehr & Schmidt `inequity aversion'model is applied to results from dictatorexperiments in which the money to bedivided is generated by the efforts ofpaired individuals in either one or tworooms. This production leads to sharingbehavior qualitatively different from thatfound in other dictator experiments. Thepattern of sharing can be explained byentitlements, equity, and the credibilityof the experiment.