Heterogeneous Preferences and Collective Action
Rent the article at a discountRent now
* Final gross prices may vary according to local VAT.Get Access
In recent years, scholarshave turned to alternative representationsof utility to capture motivationalheterogeneity across individuals. In theresearch reported here, we examine twomodels of heterogeneous utility –linear-altruism and inequity-aversion – inthe context of two-person, social dilemmagames. Empirical tests are conducteddrawing on data from experiments andsurveys. We find that the model ofinequity-aversion accounts for asubstantial proportion of the preferencetypes and behavior that are not explainedby the standard model of self-interestedpreferences. In contrast, the altruismmodel does not provide a significantincrease in explanatory power over theinequity-aversion model.
- Ahn, T.K. (2001). Foundations for cooperation in social dilemmas. Unpublished doctoral dissertation. Bloomington: Indiana University.
- Ahn, T.K., Ostrom, E., Schmidt, D., Shupp, R., and Walker, J., (2001). Cooperation in PD games: Fear, greed, and history of play. Public Choice 106: 137–155.
- Andreoni, J. (1990). Impure altruism and donation to public goods: A theory of warm glow giving. Economic Journal 100: 464–477.
- Bolton, G.E. and Ockenfels, A. (2000). ERC: A theory of equity, reciprocity, and competition. American Economic Review 90: 166–193.
- Cain, M. (1998). An experimental investigation of motives and information in the prisoner's dilemma game. Advances in Group Processes 15: 133–160.
- Cho, K. and Choi, B. (2000). A cross-society study of trust and reciprocity: Korea, Japan, and the U.S. International Studies Review 3: 31–43.
- Dougherty, K.L. and Cain, M. (1999). Linear altruism and the 2×2 prisoner's dilemma. Working paper. Miami: Florida International University.
- Dufwenberg, M. and Kirchsteiger, G. (1998). A theory of sequential reciprocity. Discussion Paper, CentER, Tilburg University.
- Falk, A. and Fischbacher, U. (1998). A theory of reciprocity. Working paper, University of Zürich, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics.
- Fehr, E. and Schmidt, K. (1999). A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation. Quarterly Journal of Economics 114: 817–868.
- Hayashi, N., Ostrom, E., Walker, J. and Yamagishi, T. (1999). Reciprocity, trust, and the sense of control: A cross-societal study. Rationality and Society 11: 27–46.
- Olson, M. (1965). The logic of collective action: Public goods and the theory of groups. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Rapoport, A. and Chammah, A.M. (1965). Prisoner's dilemma. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Rabin, M. (1993). Incorporating fairness in game theory and economics. American Economic Review 83: 1281–1302.
- Taylor, M. (1987). The possibility of cooperation. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Heterogeneous Preferences and Collective Action
Volume 117, Issue 3-4 , pp 295-314
- Cover Date
- Print ISSN
- Online ISSN
- Kluwer Academic Publishers
- Additional Links
- Industry Sectors
- Author Affiliations
- 1. Department of Political Science, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL, 32306, U.S.A
- 2. Department of Political Science Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN, 47408, U.S.A
- 3. Department of Economics, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN, 47408, U.S.A