Philosophical Studies

, Volume 116, Issue 3, pp 271–307

Is Intentionality Dependent upon Consciousness?

Authors

  • Uriah Kriegel
    • Department of PhilosophyBrown University
Article

DOI: 10.1023/B:PHIL.0000007204.53683.d7

Cite this article as:
Kriegel, U. Philosophical Studies (2003) 116: 271. doi:10.1023/B:PHIL.0000007204.53683.d7

Abstract

It is often assumed thatconsciousness and intentionality are twomutually independent aspects of mental life.When the assumption is denounced, it usuallygives way to the claim that consciousness issomehow dependent upon intentionality. Thepossibility that intentionality may bedependent upon consciousness is rarelyentertained. Recently, however, John Searle andColin McGinn have argued for just suchdependence. In this paper, I reconstruct andevaluate their argumentation. I am in sympathyboth with their view and with the lines ofargument they employ in its defense. UnlikeSearle and McGinn, however, I am quite attachedto a naturalist approach to intentionality. Itwill turn out to be somewhat difficult toreconcile naturalism with the notion thatintentionality is dependent upon consciousness,although, perhaps surprisingly, I will arguethat McGinn's case for such dependence iscompatible with naturalism.

Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2003