Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences

, Volume 2, Issue 4, pp 281–298

On the relation between recent neurobiological data on perception (and action) and the Husserlian theory of constitution

  • Jean-Luc Petit

DOI: 10.1023/B:PHEN.0000007311.81399.33

Cite this article as:
Petit, JL. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences (2003) 2: 281. doi:10.1023/B:PHEN.0000007311.81399.33


The phenomenological theory of constitution promises a solution for “the problem of consciousness” insofar as it changes the traditional terms of this problem by systematically correlating “subject and ” “object” in the unifying context of intentional acts. I argue that embodied constitution must depend upon the role of kinesthesia as a constitutive operator. In pursuing the path of intentionality in its descent from an idealistic level of “pure” constitution to this fully embodied kinesthetic constitution, we are able to gain access to different ontological regions such as physical thing, owned body and shared world. Neuroscience brings to light the somatological correlates of noemata. Bridging the gap between incarnation and naturalisation represents the best way of realizing the foundational program of transcendental phenomenology.

constitutionkinesthesiaactionmirror neuronsplasticity

Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2003

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jean-Luc Petit
    • 1
  1. 1.Laboratoire de Physiologie de l'Action et de la PerceptionUniversité Marc Bloch (Strasbourg) and Collège de FranceParisFrance E-mail