Journal of Philosophical Logic

, Volume 33, Issue 6, pp 583–606

Conditioning against the Grain

  • Stefan Kaufmann
Article

DOI: 10.1023/B:LOGI.0000046142.51136.bf

Cite this article as:
Kaufmann, S. Journal of Philosophical Logic (2004) 33: 583. doi:10.1023/B:LOGI.0000046142.51136.bf

Abstract

This paper discusses counterexamples to the thesis that the probabilities of conditionals are conditional probabilities. It is argued that the discrepancy is systematic and predictable, and that conditional probabilities are crucially involved in the apparently deviant interpretations. Furthermore, the examples suggest that such conditionals have a less prominent reading on which their probability is in fact the conditional probability, and that the two readings are related by a simple step of abductive inference. Central to the proposal is a distinction between causal and purely stochastic dependence between variables.

abductionconditionalsprobability

Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2004

Authors and Affiliations

  • Stefan Kaufmann
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of LinguisticsNorthwestern UniversityEvanston, IL 60208USA