Journal of Philosophical Logic

, Volume 33, Issue 4, pp 421–436

Routes to Triviality

  • Susan Rogerson
  • Greg Restall

DOI: 10.1023/B:LOGI.0000036853.44128.8f

Cite this article as:
Rogerson, S. & Restall, G. Journal of Philosophical Logic (2004) 33: 421. doi:10.1023/B:LOGI.0000036853.44128.8f


It is known that a number of inference principles can be used to trivialise the axioms of naïve comprehension – the axioms underlying the naïve theory of sets. In this paper we systematise and extend these known results, to provide a number of general classes of axioms responsible for trivialising naïve comprehension.

Abelian logiccontractionCurry's paradoxnaïve comprehensionNon-classical implicational logicsPeirce's law

Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2004

Authors and Affiliations

  • Susan Rogerson
    • 1
  • Greg Restall
    • 2
  1. 1.School of Philosophy and Bioethics School of Computer Science and Software EngineeringMonash UniversityAustralia
  2. 2.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of MelbourneAustralia