Journal of Philosophical Logic

, Volume 33, Issue 4, pp 421–436

Routes to Triviality

Authors

  • Susan Rogerson
    • School of Philosophy and Bioethics School of Computer Science and Software EngineeringMonash University
  • Greg Restall
    • Department of PhilosophyUniversity of Melbourne
Article

DOI: 10.1023/B:LOGI.0000036853.44128.8f

Cite this article as:
Rogerson, S. & Restall, G. Journal of Philosophical Logic (2004) 33: 421. doi:10.1023/B:LOGI.0000036853.44128.8f

Abstract

It is known that a number of inference principles can be used to trivialise the axioms of naïve comprehension – the axioms underlying the naïve theory of sets. In this paper we systematise and extend these known results, to provide a number of general classes of axioms responsible for trivialising naïve comprehension.

Abelian logiccontractionCurry's paradoxnaïve comprehensionNon-classical implicational logicsPeirce's law

Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2004