Routes to Triviality Authors
Cite this article as: Rogerson, S. & Restall, G. Journal of Philosophical Logic (2004) 33: 421. doi:10.1023/B:LOGI.0000036853.44128.8f Abstract
It is known that a number of inference principles can be used to trivialise the axioms of naïve comprehension – the axioms underlying the naïve theory of sets. In this paper we systematise and extend these known results, to provide a number of general classes of axioms responsible for trivialising naïve comprehension.
Abelian logic contraction Curry's paradox naïve comprehension Non-classical implicational logics Peirce's law REFERENCES
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