, Volume 60, Issue 3, pp 371–416

Twenty-One Arguments against Propensity Analyses of Probability

  • Antony Eagle

DOI: 10.1023/B:ERKE.0000023408.61887.6a

Cite this article as:
Eagle, A. Erkenntnis (2004) 60: 371. doi:10.1023/B:ERKE.0000023408.61887.6a


I argue that any broadly dispositional analysis of probability will either fail to give an adequate explication of probability, or else will fail to provide an explication that can be gainfully employed elsewhere (for instance, in empirical science or in the regulation of credence). The diversity and number of arguments suggests that there is little prospect of any successful analysis along these lines.

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© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2004

Authors and Affiliations

  • Antony Eagle

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