Metaphysical realism as a pre-condition of visual perception
- Cite this article as:
- Boulter, S.J. Biology & Philosophy (2004) 19: 243. doi:10.1023/B:BIPH.0000024405.82013.34
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In this paper I present a transcendental argument based on the findings of cognitive psychology and neurophysiology which invites two conclusions: First and foremost, that a pre-condition of visual perception itself is precisely what the Aristotelian and other commonsense realists maintain, namely, the independent existence of a featured, or pre-packaged world; second, this finding, combined with other reflections, suggests that, contra McDowell and other neo-Kantians, human beings have access to “things as they are in the world” via non-projective perception. These two conclusions taken together form the basis of “Aristotelian” metaphysical realism and a refutation of the neo-Kantian “two-factor” approach to perception.