Biology and Philosophy

, Volume 19, Issue 2, pp 243–261

Metaphysical realism as a pre-condition of visual perception

  • Stephen J. Boulter
Article

DOI: 10.1023/B:BIPH.0000024405.82013.34

Cite this article as:
Boulter, S.J. Biology & Philosophy (2004) 19: 243. doi:10.1023/B:BIPH.0000024405.82013.34

Abstract

In this paper I present a transcendental argument based on the findings of cognitive psychology and neurophysiology which invites two conclusions: First and foremost, that a pre-condition of visual perception itself is precisely what the Aristotelian and other commonsense realists maintain, namely, the independent existence of a featured, or pre-packaged world; second, this finding, combined with other reflections, suggests that, contra McDowell and other neo-Kantians, human beings have access to “things as they are in the world” via non-projective perception. These two conclusions taken together form the basis of “Aristotelian” metaphysical realism and a refutation of the neo-Kantian “two-factor” approach to perception.

Anti-realismAristotleConstructivismDarwinEvolutionary biologyKantMetaphysical realismVisual perception in vertebrates

Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2004

Authors and Affiliations

  • Stephen J. Boulter
    • 1
  1. 1.Field Chair for Philosophy, Westminster Institute of EducationOxford Brookes UniversityOxfordUK