Simultaneous Pooled Auctions
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Suppose a seller wants to sell k similar or identical objects and there are n > k potential buyers. Suppose that each buyer wants only one object. In this case, we suggest the use of a simultaneous auction that would work as follows. Players are asked to submit sealed bids for one object. The individual with the highest bid chooses an object first; the individual with the second-highest bid chooses the next object; and this process continues until the individual with the kth highest bid receives the last object. Each individual pays the equivalent to his or her bid. When objects are identical, we show that the proposed auction generates the same revenue as a first-price sealed-bid sequential auction. When objects are perfectly correlated, there is no known solution for sequential auctions, whereas we can characterize bidding strategies in the proposed auction. Moreover, the proposed auction is optimal (given an appropriately chosen reserve price), and it may be easier and cheaper to run than a sequential auction.
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- Simultaneous Pooled Auctions
The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics
Volume 17, Issue 3 , pp 219-232
- Cover Date
- Print ISSN
- Online ISSN
- Kluwer Academic Publishers
- Additional Links
- simultaneous auctions
- revenue equivalence
- condominium auctions
- Industry Sectors
- Author Affiliations
- 1. Department of Economics, Faculty of Economics and Commerce, Australian National University, Canberra, ACT, 0200, Australia Email
- 2. Instituto de Matema´tica Pura e Aplicada, Estrada Dona Castorina 110, Jardim Bota^nico, Rio de Janeiro, RJ, CEP 22460, Brazil Email