Article

Public Choice

, Volume 116, Issue 1, pp 165-184

First online:

Voting Rules, Manipulability and Social Homogeneity

  • Dominique LepelleyAffiliated withGEMMA, University of Caen
  • , Fabrice ValognesAffiliated withDepartment of Economics, Le Havre University

Rent the article at a discount

Rent now

* Final gross prices may vary according to local VAT.

Get Access

Abstract

To what extent are some voting rules more vulnerable tostrategic manipulation than others? In order to answer thisquestion, representations are developed for the coalitionalmanipulability of eight voting rules under various assumptionsconcerning the likelihood that given voters' preferenceprofiles are observed on three alternatives. Of particularinterest is the impact that social homogeneity (defined as thetendency of voters' preference to be similar) has on themanipulability of voting rules. The results we obtain showthat the hierarchy of the voting rules that results from ourcomputations can crucially depend on the degree of socialhomogeneity. However, it turns out that, whatever the degreeof homogeneity, the Hare method (or two-stage plurality)minimizes susceptibility to strategic manipulation bycoalitions of voters in three-candidate elections.