Sophisticated Voting Under the Sequential Voting by Veto1
- Fany Yuval
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The research reported here was the first empirical examination of strategic voting under the Sequential Voting by Veto (SVV) voting procedure, proposed by Mueller (1978). According to this procedure, a sequence of n voters must select s out of s+m alternatives (m≥n≥2; s>0). Hence, the number of alternatives exceeds the number of participants by one (n+1). When the ith voter casts her vote, she vetoes the alternative against which a veto has not yet been cast, and the s remaining non-vetoed alternatives are elected. The SVV procedure invokes the minority principle, and it has advantages over all majoritarian procedures; this makes SVV a very desirable means for relatively small groups to make collective decisions. Felsenthal and Machover (1992) pointed out three models of voting under SVV: sincere, optimal, and canonical. The current research investigated, through laboratory experiments, which cognitive model better accounts for the voters' observed behavior and the likelihood of obtaining the optimal outcome as a function of the size of n (when s=1). The findings suggest that while voters under SVV use all three models, their choice is conditioned by group size. In the small groups (n=3), the canonical mode was a better predictor than the sincere model. In the larger groups (n=5), the sincere model was a better predictor than the canonical model. There is also evidence of players' learning during the experiment.
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- Sophisticated Voting Under the Sequential Voting by Veto1
Theory and Decision
Volume 53, Issue 4 , pp 343-369
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- Print ISSN
- Online ISSN
- Kluwer Academic Publishers
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- Minority principle
- Strategic voting
- Voters' behavior
- Industry Sectors
- Fany Yuval (1)
- Author Affiliations
- 1. Department of Political Science, University of Haifa, Mount Carmel, Haifa, 31905, Israel