Abreu, D. and H. Matsushima, 1990, Virtual implementation in iteratively undominated strategies, *Econometrica* 60, 993–1008.

Aumann, R. and A. Brandenburger, 1995, Epistemic foundations of Nash equilibrium, *Econometrica* 63, 1161–1180.

Doyle, J., 1990, Rationality and its role in reasoning, *Proceedings AAAI-90*.

Dung, P., 1995, On the acceptability of arguments and its fundamental role in non-monotonic reasoning, logic programming, and *n*-person games, *Artificial Intelligence* 77, 321–357.

Fudenberg, D. and J. Tirole, 1991, *Game Theory*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Halmos, P., 1960, *Naive Set Theory*, New York: Van Nostrand.

Kraus, S., J. Wilkenfeld and G. Zlotkin, 1995, Multiagent negotiation under time constraints, *Artificial Intelligence* 75, 297–345.

Loui, R., 1987, Defeat among arguments: a System of Defeasible Inference, *Computational Intelligence* 3, 100–106.

Loui, R., 1990, Defeasible specification of utilities, in *Knowledge Representation and Defeasible Reasoning*, H. Kyburg et al., (eds.) Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Loui, R., 1998, Process and policy: resource-bounded non-demonstrative reasoning, *Computational Intelligence* 14, 1–38.

Moore, J., 1992, Implementation in economic environments with complete information, in *Advances in Economic Theory*, Laffont, J. (ed.), Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.

Myerson, R., 1991, *Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Sen, A., 1986, Social choice theory, in K. Arrow and M. Intriligator (eds.) *Handbook of Mathematical Economics III*, Amsterdam: Elsevier.

Simari, G. and R. Loui, 1992 A mathematical treatment of defeasible reasoning and its implementation, *Artificial Intelligence* 53, 125–157.

Simon, H., 1982, *Models of Bounded Rationality*, Cambridge MA: MIT Press.

Sandholm, T. and V. Lesser, 1997, Coalitions among computationally bounded agents, *Artificial Intelligence* 94, 99–137.

Stokey, N., R. Lucas, and E. Prescott, 1989, *Recursive Methods in Economic Dynamics*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Tarski, A., 1955, A lattice-theoretical fixpoint theorem and its applications, *Pacific Journal of Mathematics* 5, 285–309.

Tohmé, F., 1996, *Negotiation as a Resource Allocation Process*, Washington University in Saint Louis Computer Science Technical Report WUCS-96-22.

Verheij, B., 1996, *Rules, Reasons and Arguments: Formal Studies of Argumentation and Defeat*, Ph.D. Thesis, Maastricht (The Netherlands): Maastricht University.

von Neumann, J. and O. Morgenstern, 1944, *Theory of Games and Economic Behavior*, New York: Wiley.

Vreeswijk, G., 1991, The Feasibility of Defeat in Defeasible Reasoning, *Proceedings Second International Conference on Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning*.

Vreeswijk, G., 1993, Studies in Defeasible Argumentation, Ph.D. thesis, Amsterdam: Free University.