Synthese

, Volume 135, Issue 1, pp 77–118

Propositional Attitudes Without Propositions

Authors

  • Friederike Moltmann
    • Department of PhilosophyUniversity of Stirling
Article

DOI: 10.1023/A:1022945009188

Cite this article as:
Moltmann, F. Synthese (2003) 135: 77. doi:10.1023/A:1022945009188

Abstract

The most common account of attitude reports is the relational analysis according towhich an attitude verb taking that-clause complements expresses a two-placerelation between agents and propositions and the that-clause acts as an expressionwhose function is to provide the propositional argument. I will argue that a closerexamination of a broader range of linguistic facts raises serious problems for thisanalysis and instead favours a Russellian `multiple relations analysis' (which hasgenerally been discarded because of its apparent obvious linguistic implausibility).The resulting account can be given independent philosophical motivations within anintentionalist view of truth and predication.

Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2003