Environmental and Resource Economics

, Volume 24, Issue 2, pp 161–182

Product Durability and Extended Producer Responsibility in Solid Waste Management

  • Marco Runkel
Article

DOI: 10.1023/A:1022800206337

Cite this article as:
Runkel, M. Environmental and Resource Economics (2003) 24: 161. doi:10.1023/A:1022800206337

Abstract

Using a vintage durable good model, this paper investigates how extended producer responsibility (EPR) in waste management influences product durability and welfare. Four EPR instruments are discussed and compared with the benchmark in which producers do not receive price signals for waste disposal. In each case, EPR induces durability to increase. Under perfect competition the welfare change caused by EPR is unambiguously positive and one EPR instrument is even capable of implementing the first-best welfare optimum. In contrast, under imperfect competition EPR may lead to a welfare reduction. The analysis also compares EPR to non-EPR measures.

extended producer responsibilitymarket structureproduct durabilitysolid waste

Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2003

Authors and Affiliations

  • Marco Runkel
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of EconomicsUniversity of MunichMunichGermany