Philosophical Studies

, Volume 112, Issue 2, pp 135–145

Reasons Explanations and Pure Agency

Authors

  • Richard Feldman
    • Department of PhilosophyUniversity of Rochester
  • Andrei A. Buckareff
    • Department of PhilosophyUniversity of Rochester
Article

DOI: 10.1023/A:1022542004219

Cite this article as:
Feldman, R. & Buckareff, A.A. Philosophical Studies (2003) 112: 135. doi:10.1023/A:1022542004219

Abstract

We focus on the recent non-causal theory of reasons explanationsof free action proffered by a proponent of the agency theory, Timothy O'Connor. We argue that the conditions O'Connor offersare neither necessary nor sufficient for a person to act for a reason. Finally, we note that the role O'Connor assigns toreasons in the etiology of actions results in further conceptual difficulties for agent-causalism.

Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2003