Minds and Machines

, Volume 13, Issue 1, pp 87–101

Physical Hypercomputation and the Church–Turing Thesis

  • Oron Shagrir
  • Itamar Pitowsky
Article

DOI: 10.1023/A:1021365222692

Cite this article as:
Shagrir, O. & Pitowsky, I. Minds and Machines (2003) 13: 87. doi:10.1023/A:1021365222692

Abstract

We describe a possible physical device that computes a function that cannot be computed by a Turing machine. The device is physical in the sense that it is compatible with General Relativity. We discuss some objections, focusing on those which deny that the device is either a computer or computes a function that is not Turing computable. Finally, we argue that the existence of the device does not refute the Church–Turing thesis, but nevertheless may be a counterexample to Gandy's thesis.

Church–Turing thesiseffective computationGandy's thesisphysical hypercomputationsupertasks

Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2003

Authors and Affiliations

  • Oron Shagrir
    • 1
  • Itamar Pitowsky
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyThe Hebrew University of JerusalemIsrael