, Volume 13, Issue 2, pp 107–126

The Axioms of Set Theory


  • Jairo José Da Silva

DOI: 10.1023/A:1021333001717

Cite this article as:
Da Silva, J.J. Axiomathes (2002) 13: 107. doi:10.1023/A:1021333001717


In this paper I argue for the view that the axioms of ZF are analytic truths of a particular concept of set. By this I mean that these axioms are true by virtue only of the meaning attached to this concept, and, moreover, can be derived from it. Although I assume that the object of ZF is a concept of set, I refrain from asserting either its independent existence, or its dependence on subjectivity. All I presuppose is that this concept is given to us with a certain sense as the objective focus of a ”phenomenologically reduced“ intentional experience.

The concept of set that ZF describes, I claim, is that of a multiplicity of coexisting elements that can, as a consequence, be a member of another multiplicity. A set is conceived as a quantitatively determined collection of objects that is, by necessity, ontologically dependent on its elements, which, on the other hand, must exist independently of it. A close scrutiny of the essential characters of this conception seems to be sufficient to ground the set-theoretic hierarchy and the axioms of ZF.

Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2002