Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences

, Volume 1, Issue 3, pp 287–312

Heidegger's attunement and the neuropsychology of emotion

Authors

  • Matthew Ratcliffe
    • Department of PhilosophyUniversity of Durham
Article

DOI: 10.1023/A:1021312100964

Cite this article as:
Ratcliffe, M. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences (2002) 1: 287. doi:10.1023/A:1021312100964

Abstract

I outline the early Heidegger's views on mood and emotion, and then relate his central claims to some recent finding in neuropsychology. These findings complement Heidegger in a number of important ways. More specifically, I suggest that, in order to make sense of certain neurological conditions that traditional assumptions concerning the mind are constitutionally incapable of accommodating, something very like Heidegger's account of mood and emotion needs to be adopted as an interpretive framework. I conclude by supporting Heidegger's insistence that the sciences constitute a derivative means of disclosing the world and our place within it, as opposed to an ontologically and epistemologically privileged domain of inquiry.

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© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2002