A Non-cooperative Axiomatization of the Core
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We treat a class of multi-person bargaining mechanisms based on games in coalitional form. For this class of games we identify properties of non-cooperative solution concepts, which are necessary and sufficient for the equilibrium outcomes to coincide with the core of the underlying coalitional form game. We view this result as a non-cooperative axiomatization of the core. In contrast to most of the literature on multi-person bargaining we avoid a precise specification of the rules of the game. Alternatively, we impose properties of such games, which give rise to a large class of mechanisms, all of which are relevant for our axiomatization.
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- A Non-cooperative Axiomatization of the Core
Theory and Decision
Volume 53, Issue 1 , pp 1-28
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- Kluwer Academic Publishers
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- Multilateral bargaining
- Non-cooperative axiomatization
- Game equilibrium
- Industry Sectors
- Author Affiliations
- 1. Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto University, Sakyo, Kyoto, 606-8501, JAPAN
- 2. Department of Economics European University, Institute Badia Fiesolana, I-50016, San Domenico di Fiesole (FI), Italy
- 3. Department of Economics, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 91905, Israel