Theory and Decision

, Volume 53, Issue 1, pp 1-28

First online:

A Non-cooperative Axiomatization of the Core

  • Akira OkadaAffiliated withInstitute of Economic Research, Kyoto University
  • , Eyal WinterAffiliated withDepartment of Economics European University, Institute Badia FiesolanaDepartment of Economics, The Hebrew University

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We treat a class of multi-person bargaining mechanisms based on games in coalitional form. For this class of games we identify properties of non-cooperative solution concepts, which are necessary and sufficient for the equilibrium outcomes to coincide with the core of the underlying coalitional form game. We view this result as a non-cooperative axiomatization of the core. In contrast to most of the literature on multi-person bargaining we avoid a precise specification of the rules of the game. Alternatively, we impose properties of such games, which give rise to a large class of mechanisms, all of which are relevant for our axiomatization.

Multilateral bargaining Core Non-cooperative axiomatization Game equilibrium