Public Choice

, Volume 112, Issue 3, pp 351–371

Lottery Versus All-Pay Auction Models of Lobbying

  • Hanming Fang
Article

DOI: 10.1023/A:1019915126367

Cite this article as:
Fang, H. Public Choice (2002) 112: 351. doi:10.1023/A:1019915126367

Abstract

I first provide a complete characterizationof the unique equilibrium of thelottery game by n lobbyists with asymmetricvaluations, and then compare the lotteryand the all-pay auction models of lobbying.I show that the exclusion principlediscovered by Baye, Kovenock and de Vries(1993) for all-pay auction does not applyto lottery. I also show that the perverse effectthat an exogenous cap may increase thetotal lobbying expenditure in a two-bidderall-pay auction discovered by Che and Gale(1998) does not apply to lottery.

Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2002

Authors and Affiliations

  • Hanming Fang
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of EconomicsYale UniversityNew HavenU.S.A.

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