Theory and Decision

, Volume 52, Issue 3, pp 267–286

Committee Decisions with Partisans and Side-Transfers

  • Mehmet Bac
  • Parimal Kanti Bag
Article

DOI: 10.1023/A:1019678407874

Cite this article as:
Bac, M. & Kanti Bag, P. Theory and Decision (2002) 52: 267. doi:10.1023/A:1019678407874

Abstract

A dichotomous decision-making context in committees is considered where potential partisan members with predetermined votes can generate inefficient decisions and buy neutral votes. The optimal voting rule minimizing the expected costs of inefficient decisions for the case of a three-member committee is analyzed. It is shown that the optimal voting rule can be non-monotonic with respect to side-transfers: in the symmetric case, majority voting is optimal under either zero, mild or full side-transfer possibilities, whereas unanimity voting may be optimal under an intermediate side-transfer possibility. The side-transfer possibilities depend on the power of partisans (their ability or willingness to pay for neutral votes) relative to the corruptibility of neutral members (personal cost of deliberately casting a `wrong' vote).

CommitteePartisan votingVote buyingMajority ruleUnanimity rule

Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2002

Authors and Affiliations

  • Mehmet Bac
    • 1
  • Parimal Kanti Bag
    • 2
  1. 1.Faculty of Arts and SciencesSabanci UniversityIstanbulTurkey
  2. 2.Department of Economics and Finance, Birkbeck CollegeUniversity of LondonLondonU.K.