On the Political Economy of Low Skilled Immigration and the Welfare State
- Alexander Kemnitz
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This paper inquires into the collective decision making on both unemployment insurance and immigration. It is shown that low skill immigration typically increases the contribution rate to the unemployment insurance system. This can translate into higher benefits, the increase of the economy-wide unemployment rate nonwithstanding. The host country allows for immigration only if high skilled natives are sufficiently powerful. Furthermore, political rights of immigrants are restricted to a minimum.
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- On the Political Economy of Low Skilled Immigration and the Welfare State
International Tax and Public Finance
Volume 9, Issue 4 , pp 423-434
- Cover Date
- Print ISSN
- Online ISSN
- Kluwer Academic Publishers
- Additional Links
- immigration policy
- Industry Sectors
- Author Affiliations
- 1. Department of Economics, University of Mannheim, D-68131, Mannheim, Germany