Annals of Operations Research

, Volume 109, Issue 1, pp 175–192

Imperfect Inspection Games Over Time

  • Daniel Rothenstein
  • Shmuel Zamir
Article

DOI: 10.1023/A:1016352202713

Cite this article as:
Rothenstein, D. & Zamir, S. Annals of Operations Research (2002) 109: 175. doi:10.1023/A:1016352202713

Abstract

We consider an inspection game played on a continuous finite time interval. The inspector wishes to detect a violation as soon as possible after it has been made by the operator. The loss to the inspector is assumed to be linear in the duration of the time elapsed between the violation and its detection. This paper is mostly an extension of Diamond's models for a single inspection, which includes the uncertainty aspect, by relaxing the assumption that the inspection is perfect. Here the inspection is imperfect; it has a Type One Error which means that the inspector may call a false alarm (with probability α), and a Type Two Error which means that the inspection may fail to detect (with probability β) a violation which did occur. In addition we will assume that the inspection is silent, i.e., the operator is unaware of the inspection when it takes place, unless the inspector calls a false alarm.

Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2002

Authors and Affiliations

  • Daniel Rothenstein
    • 1
  • Shmuel Zamir
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Statistics and the Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision TheoryThe Hebrew University of JerusalemIsrael