Does Classicism Explain Universality?
- Steven PhillipsAffiliated withCognitive and Behavioral Sciences Group, Neuroscience Research Institute, AIST
Rent the article at a discountRent now
* Final gross prices may vary according to local VAT.Get Access
One of the hallmarks of human cognition is the capacity to generalize over arbitrary constituents. Recently, Marcus (1998, 1998a, b; Cognition 66, p. 153; Cognitive Psychology 37, p. 243) argued that this capacity, called “universal generalization” (universality), is not supported by Connectionist models. Instead, universality is best explained by Classical symbol systems, with Connectionism as its implementation. Here it is argued that universality is also a problem for Classicism in that the syntax-sensitive rules that are supposed to provide causal explanations of mental processes are either too strict, precluding possible generalizations; or too lax, providing no information as to the appropriate alternative. Consequently, universality is not explained by a Classical theory.
- Does Classicism Explain Universality?
Minds and Machines
Volume 12, Issue 3 , pp 423-434
- Cover Date
- Print ISSN
- Online ISSN
- Kluwer Academic Publishers
- Additional Links
- structural consistency
- Steven Phillips (1)
- Author Affiliations
- 1. Cognitive and Behavioral Sciences Group, Neuroscience Research Institute, AIST, Tsukuba Central 2, 1-1-1 Umezono, Tsukuba, Ibaraki, 305-8568, Japan